THE STOCKHOLDER'S COMMON LAW RIGHT
TO NOTICE OF BUSINESS TO BE
TRANSACTED AT MEETINGS

T

HE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION' devoted during the past fifteen years to the scope and general significance of the so-called
"proxy-rules" 2 promulgated under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934P has all but obscured the rather meager consideration 4 of corporate proxy law beyond the reach of this federal regulation.5
This latter dearth of recent scholarly consideration, however, by no
means reflects the comparative importance of the common law rules
which, in fact, govern the majority of American corporations in this
respect. Rather, it would seem possibly to indicate a need for their current re-examination, redefinition, and re-evaluation. To this end, attention will here be directed to a study of a particularly incoherent segment
'E.g., Loss, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 52i-61 (195i)5 Bayne, Around & Beyond
the SEC-The Disenfranchised Stockholder, z6 IND. L.J. 207 (1951) ; Caplin, Proxies,
Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653
(i 5i) ; Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L.J. 635 (195o); Emerson and Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective Stockholder Participation: the Sparks-Worthington
Proxy Contest, 6o YALE L.J. 429 (i95i) 5 Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate
Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REV. 796 (1950) 5 Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the
Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L.
REV. 226 (1940) 5 Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations: Effect on Ability
of the Corporationto Hold a Valid Meeting, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 483 (1939) ; Emerson
and Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 U. CHI.
L. REV. 807 (952) 5 Notes, 57 YALE L.J. 874 (94.8);
33 ILL. L. REV. 914 (1939)
53 HARV. L. REV. i65 (1940) 5 21 TEMPLE L.Q. 406 (1948).
'The "proxy rules" most pertinent to the following discussion are: Rule X-i 4A- 3
and its adjunct Schedule 14 A, which prescribe in detail the information to be included in the proxy statements; Rule X-i 4A- 5 , which outlines how the information shall
be presented; Rule X-14 A-9 , which prohibits false or misleading statements5 Rule
X-1 4 A- 4 , which requires that the corporation provide a means by which the stockholders
can specify their vote on each matter to be acted upon; Rule X-i 4 A-7 , specifying the
information which must be mailed to a stockholder at his request; and Rule X-x 4 A-8,
which requires the publication of stockholders' proposals by the corporation.
'48 STAT. 88x 0934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a etseq. (1946).
81 SOL. J. 875 (1937) ; Note, 51 A.L.R. 94.1 (1927).
' These proxy rules govern solicitations only by companies regulated by the Securities Exchange Act, which comprise corporations with securities listed on the national
securities exchanges, and by companies subject to the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 under § Iz, 49 STAT. 823 (935), 15 U.S.C. § 7 9 k (g) (940)
and the
Investment Company Act of 1940 under § 2o(a), 54 STAT. 8z2, 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-zo(a)
(1940).
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of these common law rules-those specifying the notice that must be
given to stockholders in order to validate proceedings at a subsequent
stockholders' meeting-with a view toward rearticulating their purpose
and the proper scope of their operation.
THE PRESENT CONFUSION IN THE LAW

The generalized statement of the law in this area is well recognized:0 corporate affairs of an unusual or extraordinary character may
not properly be brought before a meeting without prior notice to the
stockholders.7 Charter' or by-law' amendments and mergers 0 would
obviously be within the class of business which must thus be specifically
noted. Regular corporate elections 1 and approval of the reports of
85 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. §§

zooS,

2009

(Perm. ed.

1952); STEVENS, CORPORA-

TIONS § 119, at 538-39 (zd ed. 1949); 3 COOK, CORPORATIONS § 595 (8th ed. 1923);
BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § i71 (revised ed. 1946); ANGELL & AMES, CORPORATIONS
§§ 488-89 (iith ed. 1882); 1 BEACH, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 279 (1891)) 1

MoRAwErz, PRIVATE COaORATIONS § 482 (zd ed. 1886); 2 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS §§ 906, 926 ( 3 d ed. 1927).
'Atlantic Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N.H. 252 (1858); Warner v.
Mower, 11 Vt. 385 (1839); Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co.,
6 F.2d 228 (D. Minn. 1975); Bagley v. Reno Oil Co., 2o Pa. 78, 50 Atl. 76o,
56 L.R.A. 184 (1902). Notices of special meetings must state the object thereof, and
no business other than that stated may be considered. Noremac v. Centre Hill Court,
164 Va. 151, 178 S.E. 877 (x935); Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio
App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (I93x)
Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
117 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. goz)5 Citrus Growers' Development Ass'n v. Salt River V.
W. Users' Ass'n, 34 Ariz. io5, z68 Pac. 773 (1g8); Dolbear v. Wilkinson, 172
Cal. 366, 156 Pac. 488 (1916); American Tube Works v. Boston Mach. Co., 193
Mass. 5, 29 N.E. 63 (1885); People's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14 Gray 440
(Mass. 86o); Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line R.R., 35 Mich. 247 (1877).
'Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S.E. 8xo (1923).
OBushway Ice Cream Co. v Fred H. Bean Co., 284 Mass. 239, 187 N.E. 537
(933)5 Klein v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super. 369, 11 A.zd 770 (940) ;
Rogers v. Hill, 6o F.zd 1o9 (2d Cir. 1932); Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, i7 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 19oz) Jones v. Concord & M. R.R., 67 N.H. 119, 38
Ad. 120 (89z); Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Montgomery County v. Farquhar, 86 Md.
668, 39 At. 527 (1898); Bagley v. Reno Oil Co., 201 Pa. 78, 50 Atl. 76o, 56 L.R.A.
x84 (1902); In re Fleetwood Bank, 283 N.Y. 157, 27 N.E.2d 974, reversilg, 258
App.Div. 1057, 17 N.Y.S.zd 691 (1940); Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.,
19 Del. Ch. 172, i65 Atl. 136 (1933).
"°Jones v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 297 Ill.App. 513, i8 N.E.2d 113 (-938);
Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (193-)
""Itis . . . almost an invariable statutory requirement that a regular meeting for
the election of directors be held annually." STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § i9, at 538 (2d
ed. 1949). Likewise corporate charters or by-laws usually provide for the election of

directors at the annual meetings. In Sampson v. Bowdoinham Steam Mill Corp., 36
Me. 78 (1853), where the by-laws provided both that the directors should be elected
.annually and that specific notice of all business to be conducted at annual meetings
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officers1 2 would, on the other hand, fall within the normal course of
activities. Intermediate examples present questions of degree, and dividing lines might be expected to have crystallized as factual situations
arose in a case-to-case evolutionary process. The course of judicial decisions in this penumbral area, however, has not paralleled the ordinaryextraordinary business dichotomy-at least as these terms are commonly
understood. Confusion has arisen from the fact that cases which purportedly have turned on this distinction have involved attacks not only
by stockholders actually claiming disenfranchisement by inadequate
notice, but also by parties in such grossly disparate situations as the
following: creditors seeking priority over other creditorsj 13 stockholders
suing promoters for a breach of fiduciary duty;14 a dominant director
seeking to avoid an unfavorable contract with another corporation; 5'
fully informed owners of a dose corporation fighting for control;'6
a reneging stockholder of an insolvent corporation seeking to avoid
liability for subscription price;' 7 and, conversely, a corporation resisting
payment of further dividends on stock originally issued at an inadequately noticed meeting.'
Attempts to accommodate these multifarious interests within the
narrow limits of notice requirement rules have resulted in the generation of numerous inconsistencies in doctrinal pronouncement and in
application. The invocation of classic agency concepts'" and of such docshould be given to stockholders, the court held that the first provision was sufficient
notice of the election of directors and that the second provision referred to all other
business. Such elections held at special shareholders? meetings, however, are irregular
and notice must be given that this action is contemplated. Dolbear v. Wilkinson, 172
Cal. 366, x56 Pac. 488 (1916) People's Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Westcott, 14. Gray
440 (Mass. 186o) ; Dunster v. Bernards Land & Sand Co., 74 N.J.L. 132, 65 Adt.
z3
(i9o6). Contra: Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal.2d 220, oo P.2d 765
(1940).
2 Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., i F. Supp. 868 (S.D.
N.Y. 193z).
21 Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass. 37, 31 N.E. 698 (1892); Beecher v.
Marquette & Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 45 Mich. 103, 7 N.W. 695 (Mi88).
"Tompkins v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Md. 560, 5 4 Atl. 254 (903).
1a Des Moines Life & Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co., 6 F.zd zz8 (D. Minn.
1925).

'L People v. Mathiesson,

269

Ill. 499, 1o9 N.E. 1056 (1915) ; Dunster v. Bernards

Land & Sand Co., 74 N.J.L. 132, 65 Atl. 123 (i9o6).
17 Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 ( 9 th Cir. 1898); American Tube
Works v. Boston Mach. Co., 139 Mass. 5, 29 N.E. 63 (i885).
18 Richardson v. Vermont & Massachusetts R.R., 4+ Vt. 613 (1872).
10 Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1928) 5 Columbia Nat'l
Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 ( 9 th Cir. 1898). The relationship of shareholder to
proxy-holder is most frequently categorized in terms of principal and agent. Bache v.
Central Leather Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 484, 81 Atl. 571 (i91i) ; Warren v. Pim, 66
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trines as waiver of notice by the duly appointed

proxy,20

estoppel by

participation 2' or receipt of benefits, 22 and laches by the stockholder,23

has largely cancelled the force of the allegedly general rules requiring
notice by the development of a complete repertory of contradictory
alternatives. This wide choice of rationales has, in several instances,
enabled courts to achieve equitable results in cases where the claim of
inadequate notice was interposed in attempts to secure an unconscionable
advantage in matters not directly affected by such lack of notice. 4
Unfortunately, however, other courts have lost sight of the basic reasons for requiring notice and have been driven to manifestly inequitable
N.J. Eq. 353, 59 Atl. 773 (1904). See STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § x8 (zd ed. 1949).
Accordingly, proxy-holders have been classified as "general agents" and "special agents"
in order to define more definitely their powers to bind the shareholder. Emerson &
Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective Stockholder Partlcipation, 59 YALE L.J. 635, 636 n. 7 (1950). See also 33 ILL. L. REvI. 914, 9x6 (939)
"0Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 1902);
M'Clean v. Bradley, z8z Fed. ioii (N.D. Ohio 19z2); Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1928); Mackenzie v. Taggart, 1o Colo. 357, 73 P.zd
978 (1937); Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co., 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 984
(igxP); Foote v. Greilick, x66 Mich. 636, 13z N.W. 473 (x~ix); Columbia Nat'l

Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 ( 9 th Cir. i898); Seaman v. Ironwood Amusement
Corp., 283 Mich. 220, 278 N.W. 51 (1938) ; Tompkins v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Md.
56o, 54 Adt. 254 (1903).
2'Weinburgh v. Union St. Ry. Advertising Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 640, 37 At. 10Z6
(1897); Smith v. Stone, z Wyo. 62, 128 Pac. 612 (1912); Gewasi v. Societa

Guiseppi Garibaldi, 96 Conn. 5o,

11z

At. 693

(1921).

Contra: Klein v. Scranton

Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa.Super. 369, ix A.zd 770 (1940).
"Comm'r of Banks v. Tremont Trust Co., 259 Mass. 162, 156 N.E. 7 (1927).
Contra: American Tube Works v. Boston Mach. Co., 139 Mass. 5, 29 N.E. 63 (x885).

"In

Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, x17 Fed. 379, 385 (6th Cir.

1902) the court said that "nothing but the most active diligence in repudiating what

was there done in [a stockholder's] name and by her apparent consent can avoid the
consequences of her agent's action [i.e., the vote of her proxy-holder]." In that case
the stockholder had waited one year before attacking a by-law amendment approved
at an inadeguately noticed special meeting. In Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d 240
(Del. Ch. 1954), however, the court refused to sustain the defendant's contention that
the plaintiff should be barred bUylaches for "failing to assert the illegality of the transaction for a period of over five years, notwithstanding her knowledge of the alleged acts
of wrongdoing." Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. i. Consider also M'Clean v.
Bradley, 282 Fed. ioix

(N.D. Ohio i92z), where a former stockholder was attacking

the ratification of a mortgage after an interval of xz years and the court chose to deny
relief on the ground that the plaintiff's proxy-holder had waived adequate notice by
voting at the meeting--surely a theory that does greater violence to the rules requiring
notice than would a laches rationalization.
"Mackenzie v. Taggart, ox Colo. 357, 73 P.zd 978 (1937); Columbia Nat'l
Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 ( 9 th Cir. 1898) ; Foote v. Greilick, x66 Mich. 636, 137
N.W. 473 (911);

M'Clean v. Bradley,

282

Fed.

1o1

(N.D. Ohio

gz2).
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conclusions by the uncritical recognition of one particular line of reasoning to the exclusion of all others. 5
REAPPRAISAL OF

BASIc

CONCEPTS AND A
OF CASES

NEW

CLASSIFICATION

The rules requiring advance notice of any extraordinary business to

be conducted at a meeting were evidently fostered by a felt necessity
for the protection of stockholders' interests. The fundamental premise
underlying this protection is that the right to be adequately informed
is a necessary adjunct to the exercise of the ultimate control vested in
the stockholders. This right, of course, is qualified to the extent that it
impinges upon other rights recognized by the law in the business community. Specifically, these other rights may be categorized into two
groups. First, non-dissenting stockholders in the enterprise have an
interest in having its business conducted smoothly and without the
overbearing demands or regressive litigation of a contentious few.
Second, third parties have a right to expect that their dealings with the
corporation will have a finality not to be impaired by defects of internal
management.
The necessity for defining as precisely as possible the dividing lines
between these conflicting interest demands a -test by which to determine
when these notice rules may validly be invoked. Since the conclusion
that a stockholder may or may not claim the protection of the rules is
usually reached, at least ostensibly, by a determination of whether or not
the business conducted was extraordinary, the proper approach would
appear to be a phrasing of criteria by which the extraordinary content of
business arising at a stockholders' meeting may be gauged. In this connection, the mere characterization of business as "important" is not instructive, for the importance of a matter varies with the business aspects
to which the term has reference.2 6 A contract, for example, may be "important" because of the monetary consideration involved; or because
of the long-term nature of its commitments; or then again because of
the extent to which it will necessitate or conduce a change in future corporate policies.2
Some commentators have asserted that the basis for requiring notice
" American Tube Works v. Boston Mach. Co., 139 Mass. 5, 29 N.E. 63 (.885) ;
Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.2d 97 ( 5 th Cir. 1928) 5 Baillie v. Oriental Tel.
& Elec. Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 503.
"The corporation laws of most states require a vote of the shareholders on certain
specified transactions, e.g., employee stock option plans. It would seem that any matter
so singled out by the legislature would be "important?' business in all respects, and so

would demand specific notice unless otherwise provided by the statute. See CAL. CoRP.
CODE ANN. § 2201 (Deering 1953).
--See Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Union Pac. Ry., 47 Fed. 15 (C.C. Neb. 189x).
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of only unusual business is the assumption that the stockholders expect
action only on business of an ordinary nature. 2 8 It would follow that
the decisive characteristic of an extraordinary matter should be the extent to which surrounding circumstances give rise to an expectation
that it will be considered at a meeting.29 The language in several cases
seems to be in accord with this analysis,3 ° but the difficulties arising
'8 ANGELL&AMEs, CORPORATIONS § 488 (iith ed. 188z); x BEACH, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 279 (189i) 5 1 MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 479 (2d ed. x886).
It will be noted that all of these works are now rather outdated. This might suggest
that increasing economic complexity has forced corporation law away from the original
proposition that stockholders should exercise their franchise by consulting and deliberating together, and that pure democracy in corporate government has given way to a
representative form, with stockholders appointing proxy-holders to vote for them.
Acceptance of this proposition would compel the conclusion that the function of notice
of meetings is to enable the stockholders to choose their representative proxy-holders
intelligently. See note 29 infra. This thesis has considerable appeal when applied to
large public issue corporations. In the case of a dose corporation, however, it is not
impracticable for all stockholders to attend meetings and have the benefit of each
other's experience and advice. This suggests the further thought that perhaps one set
of rules should apply to large corporations (representative government) and a wholly
different set to small corporations (pure democracy).
"A reasonable-expectancy test such as this presupposes that the purpose to be
accomplished by giving notice to stockholders is only to warn them that a certain
general subject matter will be considered, not to furnish them with information upon
which their judgment may operate and from which they may draw a conclusion as to
the wisdom of the proposed action. The divergence of opinion (more often subconscious
than not) on this particular point finds expression in the wide conflict as to what degree
of specificity in a notice of meeting will suffice and to what extent it is incumbent upon
the stockholder to resort to outside sources for further enlightenment. Of course, a
great variety of considerations, unique in every case, enters into a court's decision
as to whether a notice of meeting should contain a specification of details; but it is
believed that the following two groups of cases reflect fundamentally different evaluations of what ends are to be served by such notice:
Details required: Klein v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super. 369, it A.zd
770 (940); United Gold & Platinum Mines Co. v. Smith, 44 Misc. 567, 9o N.Y.
Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Jones v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 297 Ill. App. 513, 18
N.E.2d 113 (1938); In re Bridport Old Brewery Co., L.R. 2 Ch. 1g (1867) ; Baillie
v. Oriental Tel. & Elec. Co., [5915] z Ch. 503; Pacific Coast Coal Mines Ltd. v.
Arbuthnot, [1917] A. C. 607. See note 6z infra.
Details not required: Rogers v. Hill, 6o F.2d 1o9 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Koplar v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937) 5 Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp. 43
Ohio App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (x93I) Jones v. Concord & M. R.R., 67 N.H. 234,
3o Ad. 614 (189z) ; Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass. 37, 31 N.E. 698 (1892).
10 "By experience and observation we know that at these regular annual meetings
only the general, routine business is transacted." Bagley v. Reno Oil Co., 2o Pa. 78,
81, 5o At. 760, 761 (0goz). "[No] reasonable construction of this notice would give
any intimation to the stockholder that such a resolution . . . would come before the
meeting." United Gold & Platinum Mines Co. v. Smith, 44 Misc. 567, 572, 9o N.Y.
Supp. 199, 202 (Sup. Ct. 1904). "In the absence of such notice, a stockholder would
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from its application31 and the number of cases not readily reconcilable
with its precepts32 suggest its rejection.
Further analysis of the cases themselves suggests instead the following possible test. The extraordinary content of corporate business
for notice requirement purposes is determined by the degree to which
that business departs from the normal function of furthering the basic
ends of the corporation and develops one or more of three tendencies:
(I) to make what are commonly designated as "fundamental changes"
in the corporate existence 33 (2) to vary the governing rules of the
corporation; 34 and (3) to advance exclusively the interests of managehave no reason to believe that this important business would be transacted. .. .
Dolbear v. Wilkinson, 17z Cal. 366, 369, 156 Pac. 488, 490 (1916). See also Logie
v. Mother Lode Copper Mines Co. of Alaska, xo6 Wash. zo8, 179 Pac. 835 (1919)
Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal.zd 22o, oo P.2d 765 (194o) 5 Dunster
v. Bernards Land & Sand Co., 74 N.J.L. 132, 65 Atl. 123 (19o6) i Des Moines Life &
Annuity Co. v. Midland Ins. Co., 6 F.zd 7.8 (D. Minn. 1925).
3' Consider, e.g., whether a court in any case would conclude that the financial
difficulties of the corporation should give rise to the expectation that dissolution would
be considered at the annual meeting. The verbal integrity of the reasonable expectancy
formula might be preserved in such a case by saying that the stockholders would not
expect anything that drastici but such circuity of reasoning would obviously impair
the value of the formula for determining the "importance" of business in borderline
cases.
" Those cases proceeding from the premise that the notice of business to be conducted should enable the stockholder to decide how he would vote (note 29 supra) are
basically repugnant to an expectancy analysis. See also Gottlieb v. McKee, 107 A.2d
240 (Del. Ch. 1954), where the court held that although the notice of meeting recounted the full details of an alleged appropriation of a corporate opportunity by the
directors, the stockholder was not expected to anticipate that another stockholder would
move to ratify the directors' action at the annual meeting.
"3McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., 122 Iowa 73x, 98 N.W. 609 (94)
(dissolution); Smith v. Stone, 21 Wyo. 6z, 128 Pac. 612 (ig2) (sale of assets);
Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga. 204, 116 S.E. So (1923) (merger) i Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., i F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)
(sale of assets) ; St. Mary's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lynch, 64 N.H. 213, 9 Atl. 98 (1887)
(dissolution) ; Stockholders of Shelby R.R. v. Louisville, C. & L. R.R., 12 Bush 6z
(Ky. 1876) (sale of assets) ; Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co., 54 Utah 12o, 179
Pac. 984 (1gg) (sale of assets) ; Germer v. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 6o
W.Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509 (19o6) (sale of assets) i Elster v. American Airlines, oo A.zd
219 (Del. Ch. 1953) (gift of corporate property); In re Bridport Old Brewery Co.,
L.R. i Ch. 191 (1867) (dissolution) ; Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line R.R., 35 Mich. 247
(1877) (consolidation).
"Klein v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super. 369, ix A.zd 770 (1940);
Jones v. Concord & M. R.R., 67 N.H. 119, 38 Atl. 120 (1892) ; Bushway Ice Cream
Co. v. Fred H. Bean Co., 284 Mass. 239, 187 N.E. 537 (i933); Bagley v.
Reno Oil Co., 2oi Pa. 78, 5o AtI. 76o, 56 L.R.A. 184 (19o2); Johnson v. TribuneHerald Co., 155 Ga. 204, ix6 S.E. 81o (1923); Dolbear v. Wilkinson, 172 Cal. 366,
156 Pac. 488 (1916) i Sampson v. Bowdoinham Steam Mill Corp., 36 Me. 78 (853)5
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The first tendency is the most extreme and thus is the most stringently regarded by the courts. Under this rubric would fall dissolutions, 36 mergers, 37 and consolidations.3 ' Likewise, sale of the corporate
assets, 39 as the amount sold increases, become "not part of the business
of carrying on the corporation, but rather subversive of it."4 0 This
stringent judicial attitude appears prominently in Starrett v. Fifth
Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp.,41 where there was a by-law to this
effect:
Any meeting of the stockholders may be held without notice,
provided all ... are present in person or by proxy, and at such
42
meeting any business may be transacted. (Emphasis added.)
Despite this provision, the court held that another by-law authorizing
receipt and action upon reports of officers at the annual meetings did
not mean that such a report could, without notice, effectively embody a
resolution for the sale of all the corporate assets, although all stockholders were present in person or by proxy.
The second tendency includes the great majority of charter 3 and
by-law"4 amendments, since it is these documents that ordinarily deLawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co., 15 Cal.zd

220, oo P.zd 765 (1940); Gow v.
Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 Adt. 136 (x933); Vogtman v.
Merchants' Mortgage & Credit Co., 2o Del. Ch. 364, 178 Atl. 99 (1935); Synnott
v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 117 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. 1902).
" Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Montgomery County v. Farquhar, 86 Md. 668, 39
At. 527 (898) ; Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, x9 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937);
United Gold & Platinum Mines Co. v. Smith, 44 Misc. 567, 90 N.Y.Supp. 199 (Sup.
Ct. 1904); Rogers v. Hill, 6o F.2d 1o9 (2d Cir. 1932); Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.2d 97 (Sth Cir. 1928); Baillie v. Oriental Tel. & Elec. Co., [1915]
i Ch. 503.
"8 McKee v. Home Savings & Trust Co., xz2 Iowa 731, 98 N.W. 609 (1904); St.
Mary's Benevolent Ass'n v. Lynch, 164 N.H. 213, 9 At. 98 (1887); In re Bridport
Old Brewery Co., L.R. i Ch. 191 (1867).
"Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (1931).
"Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line R.R., 35 Mich. 247 (6877).
30 Smith v. Stone, zi Wyo. 62, 1z8 Pac. 61z (1912) ; Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave.

& Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., i F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Stockholders of Shelby
R.R. v. Louisville, C. & L. R.R., 12 Bush 6z (Ky. 1876); Beggs v. Myton Canal &
Irrigation Co., 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 984 (1919); Germer v. Triple-State Natural
Gas & Oil Co., 6o W.Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509 (19o6).
"'M'Clean v. Bradley, 282 Fed. 1o1, ioi8 (N.D. Ohio 1922).
AI i F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
2 Id. at 872. Observe that this by-law codifies the waiver-by-proxy theory relied
upon by some courts to sustain business conducted
the claim of inadequate notice. See notes 6x and 66
'3 Johnson v. Tribune-Herald Co., 155 Ga., 204,
"Klein v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super.

at stockholders' meetings against
infra.
1x6 S.E. 81o (1923).
369, 11 A.2d 770 (1940); Jones
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lineate the system of corporate functioning. Amendments which may
possibly shift the control of the corporation would be extraordinary
business, whether the shift is effectuated by altering the composition of
the board of directors, 45 changing their tenure, 4 or redistributing voting

rights among stockholders.47 Similarly, changes in the manner in which
the profits of the enterprise are channeled to the owners would be subsumed here.4
As for the third tendency-to advance the interests of management
-the proper approach would seem to be to determine not solely the
amount of fraud or over-reaching possibly involved, but also the point
to which the interests of officers and directors are furthered, however
legitimately. 4 Since this is usually the least extreme of the tendencies
classified, the cases falling herein tend more to comprise that troublesome twilight zone between the ordinary and the extraordinary in corporate business. A comparison of three cases involving compensation of
directors will demonstrate the consequent diversity of treatment that
may be expected in this area.
In United Gold & Platinum Mines v. Smith," stock was issued to
a director for services performed in effecting the consolidation of his
corporation with another. The court, although admitting that there
was no evidence of unfairness, allowed stockholders of the consolidated
corporation to cancel the stock bonus on the ground that its issuance had
not been sufficiently embodied in the notice of meeting." Although this
v. Concord & M. R.R., 67 N.H. 119, 38 At!. izo (1892); Bagley v. Reno Oil Co.,
2ox Pa. 78, 50 Atl. 760, 56 L.R.A. 184 (i9o2) ; Bushway Ice Cream Co. v. Fred H.
Bean Co., 284 Mass. 239, 187 N.E. 537 (1933); Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines
Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172 , 165 At!. 136 0933).
"Tuttle v. Michigan Air Line R.R., 35 Mich. 247 (1877).
"Klein v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., 139 Pa. Super. 369, 11 A.2d 770 (1,940).
17Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage & Credit Co., 2o Del. Ch. 364, 178 Atl. 99
(1935) i Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, x7 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. i902).
""Jones v. Concord & M. R.R., 67 N.H. 119, 38 At!. 12o (1892); Danzig v.
Lacks, 235 App.Div. 189, 256 N.Y.Supp. 769 (1932) 5 Synnott v. Cumberland Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 117 Fed. 379 (6th Cir. x9o2).
" Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Montgomery County v. Farquhar, 86 Md. 668, 39 At.
527 (1898) ; Baillie v. Oriental Tel. & Elec. Co., [1915] 1 Ch. 503; United Gold &
Platinum Mines Co. v. Smith, 44 Misc. 567, 9o N.Y.Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1904). Cf.
Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, i9 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937) Rogers v. Hill,
6o F.zd 1o9 (2d Cir. 1932) Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories, 24 F.zd 97 (5th Cir.
1928).

so 44 Misc. 567, 90 N.Y.Supp. 199 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
"1The notice stated that the meeting was "for the purpose of considering a plan

of amalgamating the interests and properties of this company with that of [another],
and for such other business in relation thereto, as well as the general business of the
company, as may be presented to the meeting." 90 N.Y.Supp. at 202 (sup. Ct. 1904).
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rule seems sound,52 it may have been applied too rigorously in Baillie v.
Oriental Telephone & Electric Co. 3 There, the directors, having paid
themselves large salaries for several years, called a stockholders' meeting for the stated purpose of having their action ratified. The notice in
question omitted only to indicate the amount paid, 4 and the court
found that there was no overreaching and no suggestion that the action
would not be affirmed by reasonable stockholders. Nevertheless, the
omission of the one detail of amount was held to invalidate the notice. "
By way of contrast, in Gray v. Aspironal Laboratories,5 the complaining stockholder who sought to recover for the corporation the value
of the stock issued to its president under questionable circumstances was
denied this remedy by an incongruous application of straight agency
principles. 7 Although she had no personal knowledge of the transaction, the stockholder was held to be estopped by the imputation of
her proxy-holder's knowledge to her."8
INTERVENTION OF THIRD-PARTY INTERESTS-EFFECT ON

DECIsIONS

When the above analysis is applied only to cases resolving conflicts
among stockholders, there seems to emerge, despite numerous variables and occasional aberrational decisions, a rather symmetrical framework within which policy considerations can be weighed and equitable
results technically rationalized with reasonable consistency. Thus, the
interests of the corporation and stockholders as a group can be balanced
against those of a dissentient minority claiming deprivation of due notice, and the conclusions can be stated in terms of the extent to which
the matter diverges from normal corporate functions. When the interests of third parties are introduced, however, complications result
from the lack of judicial articulation of the basic thesis here advancedthat is, that requirement of notice is grounded in certain rights of individual stockholders, which are subject to the limitations imposed by
rights of other stockholders and of third parties. Consistency then be' The rule that the personal interests of directors cannot be advanced at a stock-

holders' meeting unless adequate notice is given is a direct sanction on directors, compelling their proper conduct relating to the informational needs of the stockholders.
Consequently, the very stringent application of notice requirement rules in such a situation can be justified as a prophylactic measure. See note 93 infra.
[191]

Ch. 503.

n,See note 29 supra.
"It appears that, in general, the English courts would demand a more complete
specification of details in a notice of meeting. St SOL. J. 875 (x937).
so24 F.zd 97 (Sth Cir. 19z8).
"7Note 19 supra.
" "She is bound by the act of her proxy, even though she had no personal knowledge of it, because he was her agent and she is chargeable with his knowledge." z4.
F.zd at 97-98 (5th Cir. 1928).
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gins to give way to the demands of ultimate justice seeking a set of
juridically recognized formulae.
The singularly apposite case of Mackenzie v. Taggar5 0 illustrates
this point. The notice of the annual meeting, at which a mortgage of
corporate property previously executed by the board of directors was
ratified by boiler-plate resolution, was patently insufficient to authorize
such business. ° The trial court, however, nonsuited the complainant
stockholder on the ground that the "stockholders who were there and
participated in person or by proxy should have known about it more
than anyone else. If they had no right to take this action because the
meeting was not properly called, they should not have taken it.""
(Emphasis added.) The Colorado Supreme Court, in a split decision,"2
adopted this reasoning, but with the intimation that the protection of
"+subsequently accruing rights of third parties" 3 was the guiding policy
consideration. Such a rationale obviously nullifies the requirement of
notice; any matter on which a proxy-holder votes is a "proper" matter
before the meeting.
SPURIOUS COMPLAINTS BY STOCKHOLDERS

The internal consistency of this framework of guiding principles
undergoes further erosion as stockholders seek to invoke notice requirement rules for the advancement of ulterior ends rather than for
the protection of their voting rights. The most representative of these
cases fall into two groups. In the first, changed economic conditions
prompt a stockholder to seize upon the claim of insufficient notice in
order to extricate himself from an unfavorable financial position. 4
Thus, in Columbia National Bank v. Mathews,"5 upon insolvency of
the corporation, a stockholder sought rescission and recovery of subscription price even after having received dividends on stock issued
at an inadequately noticed meeting. In denying relief, the court said:
"Any irregularity... which could be waived by [plaintiff] if personally
IS oI Co1. 357, 73 P.zd 978 (1937).
OoThe notice stated that the meeting was "for the purpose of electing directors of
the company and for the transaction and ratification of any and 'all other business that
may come before said meeting." Id. at 360, 73 P.zd at 979 (-937)"I1d.at 365, 73 P.zd at 981 (1937).
"2The dissent objected that "the plaintiff stockholder had nothing like that detailed and complete knowledge of pertinent facts which is a prerequisite to binding a
person by ratification." Id. at 367, 73 P.zd at 98z 0937).
OOId. at 366, 73 P.zd at 982 (i937).
"4Citrus Growers' Development Ass'n v. Salt River V. W. Users' Ass'n, 34
Ariz. io5, 268 Pac. 773 (2928)5 Foote v. Greilick, 166 Mich. 636, 132 N.W. 473
(igii) 5 Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Mathews, 85 Fed. 934 (gth Cir. 2898) i M'Clean v.
Bradley, 282 Fed. ioix (N.D. Ohio x922).
0 85 Fed. 934 (9 th Cir. 1898).
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present,
could be waived by his proxy, and such waiver is binding on
6
him."
The second group includes two cases0 7 in both of which a faction
of an erstwhile evenly balanced close corporation gained complete control, and the other faction resorted to the purely technical claim 8 of
inadequate notice as a counterattack. The trial court in one of these
cases69 took the position that "no stockholder can urge the invalidity
of such meeting for want of notice, unless he has been injured . . . by
lack of notice."17 On appeal, however, it was held in both cases that

lack of adequate notice rendered the business conducted "void,'1
and therefore that complete knowledge of what was happening72 or
even the presence of the stockholders in person7 3 did not waive the objection. The desire of the courts to restore the status quo in these cases
is perceptible, but their reasoning can hardly be applauded if even a
minimum of consistency is sought. As the waiver-by-proxy theory of
the first group of cases74 virtually extinguishes all protection to stockholders contemplated by requirement of notice, so the no-waiver-atall theory of this second group"' reaches the opposite extreme in extending to stockholders protection not contemplated by requirement of
notice.
STANDING OF THIRD PARTIES TO COMPLAIN

If stockholders themselves have only limited justification for complaining of inadequate notice, then surely the promotion of further
inconsistencies should be averted by an open recognition that third
parties have no standing at all to claim protection under notice requirement rules.70 This was the approach adopted in Beecher v. Marquette
66
7

1d. at 942.

Dunster v. Bernards Land & Sand Co., 74 N.J.L. 132, 65 Atl. 123 (.9o6)3
People v. Mathiesson, 269 Ill. 499, io9 N.E. io56 (19,S).
"I.e., in each case the plaintiff stockholder had suffered no injury by reason of
lack of due notice. See note 88 infra.
6
People v. Mathiesson, z69 Ill. 499, io9 N.E. 1o56 (1915).
"Id. at 503, io9 N.E. at 1057 (.95).
"' See note So infra.
"'In Dunster v. Bernards Land & Sand Co., 74 N.J.L. i32, 65 At. 123 (19o6),
it appeared that the plaintiff stockholder had been seeking to secure control of the
corporation for himself and had refused to attend the inadequately noticed meeting in
a deliberate attempt to frustrate the election of directors by the faction opposing him.
"In People v. Mathiesson, 269 Ill. 499, 1o9 N.E. io56 (91.5),
the meeting
was convened without notice, as had been the practice for the past twenty years. The
plaintiff stockholders attended but left after an altercation with the opposing faction.
""Note 64 supra.
"Note 67 supra.
"The recognition that this would be the desirable result has prompted an unqualified assertion that the law in this respect is as it should be: "So clearly are the
6
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& Pacific Rolling Mill Co.,77 wherein the corporation's property was
78

mortgaged without the notice to stockholders required by statute.
The purchaser of the corporation's equity of redemption in the mortgaged property asserted this lack of due notice as against the mortgagee.
79
After a discussion of the distinction between "void" and "voidable, 1
the court concluded that business conducted at an inadequately noticed
meeting was voidable at the election of the stockholders only, since it
was for their protection that the notice was required.80
Unfortunately, other courts have dealt with these cases by an indiscriminate application of the rules sought to be invoked.8 1 The usual
result has been a quite proper denial of any protection to the complaining third party 8 2 but language in Tilden v. Quaker Oats Co., 3
where proxies of stockholders were ioted by the directors in favor of
the sale of all the corporate assets, offers a disturbing example of the
extreme position to which such an application might lead:
Concealment of an intention to transact certain business at a
shareholders' meeting is not a violation of any right of a shareholder who gives a proxy broad enough to cover the particular
business complained of.8 4
And at the opposite extreme, American Tube Works v. Boston Machine Co.s" demonstrates how, even with such outlets as waiver and
estoppel available, a court may be compelled to a result equally as detrimental to the interests of stockholders by a literal application of the
skeleton principle that notice must always be given if the business is
extraordinary. The plaintiff, a creditor who had accepted "special
stock" in payment for his debt and had received dividends thereon for
formal requirements as to shareholders' meetings for the benefit of the shareholders
themselves, that it is held that the validity of corporate action cannot be attacked
collaterally because of formal irregularities. . . ." STEVENS, CORPORATONS § 119, at
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(2d ed. 1949).
77 45 Mich. 103, 7 N.W. 695 (1881).

"Id. at io5-o6, 7 N.W. at 695 (i8Si).
"' The court concluded that "the word void in a statute might be construed as voidable where the provision is introduced for the benefit of [certain] parties only. . . '
Id. at 1o8, 7 N.W. at 696 (SSI).
80 "qf the manifest intent is to give protection to determinate individuals [i.e., stockholders], the purpose is sufficiently accomplished if they are given the liberty of avoiding [the business]." Id. at io8, 7 N.W. at 697 (S88sI).
"'See e.g., American Tube Works v. Boston Mach. Co., 139 Mass. 5, 29 N.E.
63 (z885) ; Evans v. Boston Heating Co., L57 Mass. 37, 31 N.E. 698 (1892) ; Richardson v. Vermont & Massachusetts R.R., 44 Vt. 613 (1872).
"2 E.g., Evans v. Boston Heating Co., 157 Mass. 37, 35 N.E. 698 (1892).
83 1
F.2d 16o ( 7 th Cir. 19z).
84
I . at 166.
8 39 Mass. 5, 29 N.E. 63 (1885).
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two and a half years, was allowed to rescind as against the insolvent
corporation on the ground that the notice of the meeting at which the
stock was issued was inadequate.
CONCLUSION

The readiest conclusion adduced by the foregoing discussion is that
the common law rules of adequate notice have been so overburdened by
the liberty with which they have been applied that the protection now
afforded stockholders is frequently either quite illusory 0 or too rigidly
absolute. Hence, it appears that the course of judicial and legislative
reform in this field should tend toward a more selective application of
the adequacy-of-notice test. No stockholder should be heard to complain
of inadequate notice unless this invasion of his rights to be informed
directly bears upon the gravamen of the litigation.88 Any receipt of
benefits80 or other action manifesting acquiescence on his part0 0 should
foreclose a stockholder's claim immediately; and nothing but the most
diligent pursuit of his rights, 9' especially when the interests of third
parties have become involved, 2 should redound to his benefit.
It may be objected that such stringent limitations on the right of a
stockholder to question the validity of inadequately noticed business
will abate the compelling force of notice requirement rules as an inducement for proper disclosure. But it has become apparent that the
rules in question are relatively inefficient restraints on corporate mismanagement."3 In order to provide a minimum of compulsion on directorate practices, the force of the law must be such that dispropor"a See, e.g., note 56 supra.
7 See, e.g., note 67 supra.
88 See note 68 supra. From such a position it would follow, a fortiori, that no

creditor could complain of lack of due notice. Note 77 supra.
s Note 22 supra.
90 "The [stockholders] may possibly have had a right to take advantage of the
exact words of the statute [requiring notice], repudiate their action, and treat the

mortgage as of no force or effect, but they had an equal right to treat it as effective
and valid."

Beecher v. Marquette & Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 45 Mich. 103, 109,

7 N.W. 695, 697 (ix8).
O1Note 23 supra.
92 Note 63 supra. If a case arose in which even the most active diligence on the part
of the stockholder could not forestall the intervention of the interests of third parties,
the ideal solution might be to invalidate the inadequately noticed business and then
to allow the injured third party to recoup his losses from the directors. Such a solution would serve the very useful purpose of encouraging the directors to make notices of
meetings adequately informative. See note 5z supra, and note 93 infra.
93 If the rules requiring adequate notice are violated, the only result will be nullification of the inadequately noticed transaction. Consequently, the rules put little pressure
on directors unless they have a personal or financial interest in seeing that the particular
transaction is upheld. See note 52 supra.
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tionate hardships will result. The solution might well be found in the
formulation of a statutory scheme of direct sanctions on directors in
order to compel proper disclosure of business to be brought before
stockholders' meetings. But this would undoubtedly be difficult of attainment. 4 Perhaps, therefore, the infusion of more democratic principles into corporate government can be achieved most effectively
through the agency of a responsible legal profession in its advisory
capacity.

5

RussELL M. ROBINSON
Such an extreme measure as the imposition of criminal liability for failure
to give notice of meetings in accord with specific statutory requirements would probably not be politically feasible. As for rendering directors civilly liable for their remissness, the problem of damages seems to be one of insuperable difficulty.
O CCTh e proper adjustment of the control factor in the corporate system could best
be attained at this time on a voluntary basis under the active sponsorship of the legal
profession." Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's
Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653, 686 (.951).

